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Abstract  
Who profits in the info-coms industry in the broadband age, and how? This paper looks at this 
question, decomposing the industry in terms of five complementary activities: (1) equipment 
provision, (2) network operation, (3) Internet access and service provision, (4) navigation and 
security provision, and (5) Internet content provision, which correspond to five different 
assets in the sense of Teece (1986). By focusing on two key stylized facts (SF1: “R&D and 
patent licensing are increasingly high in this industry, but the initiators of innovations have 
greatly changed over time”, and SF2: “Small, facilities-less companies emerged during the 
development of the Internet industry, but have generally performed badly as the industry has 
matured and broadband use has become widespread”) the paper analyses the robustness of 
Teece (1986) in its ability to provide a framework appropriate to the changes that have 
occurred in the broadband industry. The paper draws some lessons, and provides some new 
considerations related to the robustness of Teece’s framework.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In 1986 David Teece published his now famous article entitled “Profiting from innovation”, a 
work that has greatly influenced research in economic organization, business strategy, 
economics of technology and innovation. The key value of his article is that it provides a 
general theory about integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy in the presence of 
technological innovation. By a general theory, we mean a guide to ongoing research into the 
economics of the innovative firm, rather than the outcome of an intellectual process that can 
be assumed to apply at all times and in all places. This guide enables observation and analysis 
of regularities in firm and industry dynamics that are not determined contextually, and the 
differences that make certain corporate or industrial conjectures unique.  
 
This paper explores whether Teece’s conclusions, made 20 years ago, apply in a world where 
profiting from innovation essentially occurs in a global, digitally interconnected economy. 
One of the keys to this global, digitally interconnected economy is without doubt broadband, 
the late stage of development of the Internet economy. The aim of this paper is to identify, 
from Teecian point of view, who, in this age of broadband, profits in the info-coms industry, 
and how. We define the info-communications industry as comprising a set of five 
complementary activities: (1) equipment provision, (2) network operation, (3) Internet access 
and service provision, (4) navigation and security provision, and (5) Internet content 
provision. These complementary activities correspond to Teece’s five assets: (1) R&D, (2) 
production of network facilities, (3) commercialization/distribution of basic Internet services, 
(4) commercialization/distribution of improved services, and (5) 
commercialization/distribution of advanced services. With the emergence of broadband, info-
coms companies have developed various organizational strategies, such as specialization in 
one type of activity, but also have followed strategies of integration and collaboration to 
enable entry into a related range of activities. These organizational strategies, in practice, are 
not all profitable and, as Teece (1986) correctly stressed as a general principle, their success 
appears to depend to a great extent on whether they are initiated by innovators or imitators, 
and how they are articulated within a) regimes of appropriability, namely the environmental 
factors that govern an innovator’s ability to capture the profits generated by an innovation; b) 
dominant design issues, i.e. whether the industry is in a phase of emergence, growth, maturity 
or decline; and c) complementary assets access, i.e. the ability of firms to develop or acquire 
 3
the capabilities required to coordinate the complementary assets corresponding to the 
development of the innovation. 
 
The paper will focus particularly on the following set of topics that are at the core of Teece’s 
paper. These topics are formulated in terms of two essential stylized facts (SF1 and SF2): 
• SF1: R&D and patent licensing are increasingly high in this industry, but the initiators 
of innovations have greatly changed over time. 
• SF2: Small, facilities-less companies have emerged everywhere during the 
development stage of the Internet industry, but have generally performed badly once 
the industry matured and broadband became more generally available. 
 
We argue that analysing who profits in the broadband industry, and how, provides an 
opportunity to revisit Teece’s article, and to draw some new angles. We reconfirm the idea 
that the dynamics of complementary assets are crucial to analyse how firms perform in an 
innovative industry along the different stages of its development life cycle. However, this 
needs to be complemented by two key elements. First, an analysis of the sources of 
technology provision, which, even in a tight appropriability regime, may stimulate the entry 
of firms with no complementary assets or core capabilities in related (upstream/downstream) 
activities, and may penalize early innovators. Second, a focus on the increasing heterogeneity 
of firms where facilities-based companies (firms that own their complementary network 
assets) compete with facilities-less firms (firms that do not own these assets). For both types 
of organization, speed in accessing complementary assets is crucial to avoid dramatic 
disequilibria, shakeout and turbulence.  
 
In essence, Teece’s seminal article emphasizes that there is a crucial problem of coordination 
within and between firms that is not spontaneously solved. The development of 
complementary assets, and especially their coordination along the process of innovation, is 
never guaranteed (whatever the stage of evolution of the industry and whatever the 
appropriability regime), especially since the capabilities needed to access these 
complementary assets have to be built over time. In this paper, we validate this principle: 
although info-coms activities are related and complementary, firms cannot always evolve 
from their initial activity to a new one. Capabilities are required to access the new 
complementary assets available, either through internal development or external cooperation 
on the basis of contracts or alliances.  
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The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we stress that it is possible to decompose the 
industry into a layered structure (Layer 1 to Layer 5), where each individual layer regroups 
companies involved in similar activities (based on the same capabilities), while 
upstream/downstream layers regroup companies involved in complementary activities (based 
on complementary capabilities). This decomposition is especially useful since it allows us to 
map how different companies locate in the different layers, based on their initial capabilities, 
and how they are able to evolve – move from one layer to another – through the development 
or acquisition of new capabilities, and access (or not) the complementary assets as defined by 
Teece. This decomposition also facilitates discussion of some stylized facts that are 
particularly significant for this industry. In Section 3, we present and analyse SF1. We stress 
that firms from Layer 1 (equipment suppliers) are today’s essential technology providers 
although, a mere decade ago, Layer 2 firms (network operators) filled this role. We show that 
this change in the sources of technology provision has had a positive impact on the entry of 
new firms in Layers 1 and 2, in particular, by attracting firms that did not possess the core 
assets or capabilities to penetrate the industry and that, in other circumstances, should have 
been prevented from entering or would have exited soon after entry. Also, this process of 
change in the initiators of technological innovation means that the initial developers of new 
technologies in Layer 1 (data processing and software companies) were frequently acquired 
by imitators (the incumbent traditional equipment suppliers), confirming Teece’s general 
prediction that early innovators do not necessarily win. In Section 4, we examine SF2 by 
focusing on firms from Layer 3 (Internet Access Providers and Internet Service Providers, the 
IAPs/ISPs). Our results show that these companies have contributed to the diffusion of the 
Internet as a technological innovation, but most failed to access the complementary assets 
necessary for high performance in the broadband world. Only the biggest ones, which 
vertically integrated into commercialization/distribution of improved and advanced services 
assets, such as AOL, Yahoo! and Google, have been able to survive and become key actors in 
the broadband economy. Section 5 concludes that 20 years on, Teece (1986) still provides a 
robust framework, which is especially useful to analyse who profits and how in the info-coms 
industry in the age of broadband. 
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2. The layered structure of the info-coms industry at the age of broadband 
 
2.1. Is broadband an innovation? 
 
Broadband is an innovation. The development of high capacity and intelligent networks has 
involved a multiplication as well as a qualitative diversity of applications. Some of the more 
prominent examples are data transfer, home banking, video on demand, videoconferencing, 
online services, Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP), e-commerce and m-commerce. An open 
set of services, sometimes referred to as Pretty Amazing New Services (PANS), is now 
available and contrasts greatly with the former telecoms system, which provided Plain Old 
Telecommunications Services (POTS), i.e. a closed set of services such as the transmission of 
voice calls and the fax (Savage and Waldman, 2005; Laffont and Tirole, 2000). In the line 
with some recent contributions (Chesbrough, 2003; Fransman, 2004; Christensen, Olesen and 
Kjaer, 2005), and also older ones (Loasby, 1991, 1999), broadband and, more generally, 
packet-switched systems, correspond to an open system of innovation, while circuit-switched 
systems were closed innovation systems.  
 
2.2. Is broadband an autonomous or systemic innovation? 
 
Whether broadband is an autonomous or a systemic innovation is a more intricate question. 
We could simply consider – as many commentators do – that this innovation development is 
like a ‘plug’ of compatible components, which is commensurate with the idea of an 
autonomous innovation2.  
 
However, here, we favour a more processual or dynamic vision of broadband as a systemic 
innovation. Broadband is the outcome of a complex combination of technologies developed 
by firms whose core activities are related to industries that previously were separate (the 
telecommunications industry for the development of infrastructure; the computer industry – 
hardware and software – for the development of equipment, navigation and security facilities; 
press, information and broadcasting sectors for the elaboration of content in broadband 
Internet services). These industries progressively merged to form a distinct industry, the 
broadband industry, with a layered structure composed of complementary assets including 
                                                 
2 The idea of modularity is present here, see Langlois (2002), Brusoni and Prencipe (2001), and Brusoni (2005). 
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R&D in broadband products and services, production/commercialization of network facilities, 
and commercialization of basic, improved and advanced services. This successful 
combination of technologies, activities and assets was not achieved spontaneously, since high 
uncertainty prevailed, and continues to prevail, about the viability of the whole system. In 
addition, their combination required elaboration of specific interfaces and organizational 
arrangements both by companies already present in these industries, but also by new 
emerging companies. In many case, these latter generated new layers that needed to be 
articulated with existing ones. 
 
2.3. Description of the layers: a set of complementary activities 
 
We define the broadband industry as a set of complementary activities, arranged in vertically-
related layers3 (see Table 1).  
 
Layers Activities Firms 
Equipment suppliers 
Incumbents Entrants 
Layer 1 Equipment provision 
Lucent, Alcatel, 
NEC, Nortel,  
Cisco, Ascend, 
BayNetworks 
Network operators 
Incumbents Entrants 
Layer 2 Network operation 
AT&T, France 
Telecom, 
Deutsche 
Telekom, BT, 
NTT 
Worldcom, Free, 
Tele2, Mannesman, 
Mobilcom,Vodafone
Layer 3 Internet access and service 
provision 
IAPS and ISPs: Wanadoo, Freeserve, 
T-online 
Layer 4 Navigation and security provision Browsers, data protection companies: 
Netscape, Yahoo!, Google 
Layer 5 Content provision E-commerce, broadcasting and 
information companies: AOL-Time 
Warner, Vivendi Universal 
 
Table 1: The info-coms industry in the age of broadband 
 
Layer 1 
Description: The ‘equipment provision layer’ (Layer 1) comprises firms (equipment 
suppliers) specialized in the conception and development of switches, transmission 
                                                 
3 See Fransman (2001, 2002, 2004); Krafft (2003, 2004); Fransman and Krafft (2002). The activity-based layer 
model developed here has connections with the idea of strategic groups introduced in the strategy literature by 
Hunt (1972), Caves and Porter (1977) and Porter (1979). For recent investigations into this connection in the 
info-coms industry, see Sabat (2002) and Li and Whalley (2002).  
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equipment, routers, servers and billing software. Within this layer, competition comes from 
the interaction between incumbents such as Lucent (previously owned by AT&T), Alcatel, 
Siemens, Nortel, NEC and new firms such as Cisco, BayNetworks, Ascend, Nokia and 
Ericsson, which developed out of Internet and mobile activities. This competition tended to 
produce waves of mergers between the two categories of firms, especially between 
incumbents and new firms (see for instance acquisitions such as Lucent-Ascend, and Northern 
Telecom-Bay Networks, now Nortel).  
Complementarity with Layer 2: Layer 1 provides Layer 2 with the equipment (highly R&D 
intensive) dedicated to network operation and management in the domain of fixed and mobile 
telephony, the Internet and multimedia. This complementarity, i.e. the way in which this 
provision is mediated, is not necessarily based on pure market relations. More cooperative 
arrangements are often required, such as the secondment of specialized engineers or 
technicians from companies in Layer 1 to companies in Layer 2 to run the technological 
systems, or to elaborate joint projects on the development of specific innovations. 
 
Layer 2 
Description: The ‘network operation layer’ (Layer 2) comprises firms involved in the 
production of network infrastructures and services. Within this layer, incumbents (AT&T, 
France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, BT, NTT) had to face competition from new entrants 
(Worldcom, Free, Tele 2, Mannesmann, Mobilcom, Vodafone), whose entry was favoured by 
the liberalization and the development of new modes of communication (fixed and mobile 
Internet). Entrants generally were performing well until the financial crash that occurred in 
2000; following this, a stable oligopoly of incumbents reemerged.  
Complementarity with Layer 3: Layer 2 provides Layer 3 with the infrastructure required for 
Internet connectivity. To achieve this complementarity between Layer 2 and Layer 3, firms 
first undertook vertical specialization; however, they later undertook mass adoption of vertical 
integration (although some reverted to a strategy of vertical specialization).  
 
Layer 3 
Description: The ‘Internet access and services provision layer’ (Layer 3) comprises firms 
(IAPs and ISPs) involved in the commercialization/distribution of basic Internet services (e-
mail, web hosting). These firms appeared as a result of the increasing development of the 
Internet. However, there is a great heterogeneity among these firms: some are facilities-based 
and own their own networks while others are facilities-less and simply lease the network that 
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others have developed; some are large and increasingly diversified while others are small and 
exclusively specialized; some provide free Internet services while others charge for these 
services. Exclusively specialized, facilities-less, and free Internet companies have tended to 
perform less successfully, and eventually exited the broadband market or were acquired 
(AOL, for instance, exited Layer 3 and consolidated its activities in Layer 4 and Layer 5 
through the acquisition of Netscape and Time Warner; Yahoo! and Google also moved to 
Layer 4).  
Complementarity with Layer 4: Layer 3 provides Layer 4 with Internet connectivity, a basic 
commodity which can be complemented by value-added services. This complementarity is 
increasingly based on a vertical integration between Layers 3 and 4. 
 
Layer 4 
Description: The ‘navigation and security provision layer’ (Layer 4) comprises firms involved 
in the commercialization/distribution of search engines, browsers, portals, secure electronic 
payment facilities, firewalls and data protection services. Highly connected with the Internet 
revolution, most of these firms have appeared relatively recently in the industry. However, 
because this layer is directly related to computing and software activities, older, established 
computer and software companies, such as IBM and Microsoft, are also present in this layer, 
but tend to be less efficient than new firms such as Netscape, Yahoo!, Copernic, and Google.  
Complementarity with Layer 5: Layer 4 provides Layer 5 with a new medium, the Internet, 
the applications of which have to be developed and distributed. This complementarity is 
increasingly requiring vertical integration between Layers 4 and 5. 
 
Layer 5 
Description: The ‘content layer’ (Layer 5) comprises firms involved in the 
commercialization/distribution of web design services, online services, e-commerce, 
information services and broadcasting services. Within this layer, a large diversity of firms 
have recently been involved in competition. Small new firms specialized in web design and e-
commerce (the ‘dot-coms’, one of the most specific examples being Amazon) initially 
performed incredibly well, but later suffered a fall in financial performance and 
competitiveness. The older established information and broadcasting firms diversified into 
Internet activities and penetrated the ‘content layer’ of the info-communications industry (see 
Bloomberg, Reuters, and Time Warner). Layer 5 provides customers with a wide spectrum of 
advanced (secure and multi-content) Internet services.  
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2.4. Complementary assets or complementary activities? 
 
So far, we have not made a strong distinction between assets and activities, and the two 
notions have been used interchangeably. However, we need to be more specific and precise 
for the following reason. Neighbouring layers of the industry represent complementary 
activities, but this does not mean that they necessarily represent exactly complementary assets 
as understood by Teece. We thus need to clarify a) what kinds of complementary assets are 
being referred to, b) the conditions under which firms are required to have access to 
complementary assets, and c) how they can access these assets.  
 
Teece (1986) starts from the key notion of the core technological know-how in innovation 
that he defines as “how to do things better than the existing state of the art” (p. 288). This 
know-how is partly codified, partly tacit, and in order for it to generate profits, it must be sold 
or utilized in some fashion in the market. Yet, in most cases, the successful commercialization 
of an innovation requires that the know-how in question be utilized in conjunction with other 
capabilities or assets. He thus advances that services such as marketing, competitive 
manufacturing, distribution, services and complementary technologies are almost always 
needed, and are often obtained from complementary assets which are specialized. He gives 
the example of the commercialization of a new drug which is likely to require the 
dissemination of information over specialist channels (this idea was further developed in 
Arora and Gambardella (1994), and related articles), and the example of computer software 
which typically requires specialist software for both the operating system and applications 
(see recent developments on this by West (2003) and Chesbrough (2003) on open source; and 
Funk (2003) on cell phones).  
 
The whole system as presented in section 2.3., and decomposed into five layers, corresponds 
to an extended production process in the Teecian framework in which conception, 
manufacturing, commercialization and distribution are present.4 There is an obvious technical 
link between the different layers: to operate the network, network infrastructure and 
                                                 
4 One could also focus on complementary assets within one particular layer. In our case, however, this option 
would significantly restrict the global vision of the broadband industry that the paper is trying to develop. 
Moreover, complementary assets à la Teece were already used to explain the close relationships between firms 
that are not in the same industry. See for instance the literature on the connection between pharmaceuticals and 
biotech companies (Arora and Gambardella, 1994). To some extent, this suggests that the boundaries of a very 
innovative industry cannot be considered as fixed, but rather as evolving through the strategies implemented by 
firms, including strategies for the access to complementary assets. 
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equipment at customer’s premises are required; also Internet access and services, and further 
content and security, are provided on the basis of the network infrastructure. However, and 
more importantly, these different subsystems can also be said to be linked from an economic 
point of view (see Table 2). Layer 1 provides most of the R&D on products and processes. 
Layer 2 essentially provides products and commercializes network facilities. Layer 3 
commercializes and distributes basic connection services. Layer 4 commercializes and 
distributes improved services related to the selection and security of the information provided 
over broadband. Layer 5 provides end-users with an advanced set of services related to 
applications and content.  
 
Layers Activities Assets 
Layer 1 Equipment provision Conception, development, R&D on 
broadband products and services 
Layer 2 Network operation Production/commercialization of 
network facilities 
Layer 3 Internet access and  service 
provision 
Commercialization/distribution of basic 
services 
Layer 4 Navigation and security provision Commercialization/distribution of 
improved services 
Layer 5 Content provision Commercialization/distribution of 
advanced services 
 
Table 2: Activities and assets in the info-coms industry in the age of broadband 
 
Each layer regroups firms that share core technological know how, i.e. they know how to do 
things better than firms located in other layers. For instance, firms in Layer 1 know how to do 
R&D better than firms located in Layers 2, 3, 4, and 5. But in order for such knowledge in 
R&D to generate profits, this knowledge has to be utilized in conjunction with other assets, 
such as production/commercialization of network facilities (assets in Layer 2), 
commercialization/distribution of basic services (assets in Layer 3), improved services (assets 
in Layer 4), and advanced services (assets in Layer 5).  
 
It is significant that the idea of core technological know-how, and thus the location of 
companies in a given layer, inevitably shapes the strategies implemented. This suggests some 
connections between our framework and the strategy literature. In the strategy literature, the 
concept of strategic group describes a group of firms with similar strategies, which are 
different from those being adopted by other firms in the same industry. In our framework, 
strategies are based on firms’ backgrounds (comprising core technological know-how, 
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specialized assets, specific domains of activity), which enable some types of action, but may 
inhibit others. Another point of connection is that the strategic decisions made by a firm 
within a strategic group cannot be imitated by firms outside the group without substantial 
costs, and thus there are barriers to imitation. In our framework, firms cannot always evolve 
from one layer to the other without the prior acquisition of the technological know-how that 
prevails in the targeted layer, or in other words without investment in the complementary 
assets that characterize this layer.  
 
2.5. The evolving nature of complementary assets: from generic to co-specialized 
 
Over time, the nature of complementary assets in the info-coms industry has changed. At its 
origins, i.e. in the era of narrowband, the Internet required the combination of technical 
interfaces to provide a set of basic services, such as e-mail, file transfer, and the design and 
hosting of websites. Firms were required to combine generic assets that did not need to be 
tailored to the innovation. The predominance of generic assets, articulated through technical 
interfaces, favoured the entry of firms whose activities were largely outside the 
telecoms/Internet field. A good example is the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP) which facilitated the transfer of bits across different networks, many of 
which used significantly different technologies. TCP/IP has enabled a technical separation of 
the network layer (Layer 2) from the service layers above it (Layers 3, 4, and 5). This meant 
that service providers did not need to own or control their own networks, but could depend on 
network services bought on the market from network operators. It also meant that the 
broadcasting and information groups were able to penetrate the industry by offering “content” 
services as a diversification of their core activities, which belonged to a distinct industry, the 
media industry.  
 
With the development of broadband, and the open set of applications and services provided 
by it, the key issue for firms in the different layers now is differentiation: what kind of 
combination with upstream/downstream firms will produce a service that is different from 
that being provided by direct competitor(s)? As a result, assets have become progressively 
specialized (involving a unilateral dependence between the innovation and the complementary 
assets) and even co-specialized (involving a bilateral dependence). To illustrate this, it is now 
common practice to contract exclusive or semi-exclusive arrangements between equipment 
suppliers and network operators, or between network operators and navigation, security or 
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content companies in the development of broadband services (see Vodafone/Vivendi 
Universal; Yahoo!/Verizon, AOL-Time Warner/Worldcom).  
 
2.6. The layered structure as a road map: searching out the relevant capabilities to 
access complementary assets  
 
Though decisive, description of the complementary assets needed to develop an innovation 
can only be considered as a preliminary step in the exercise (Williamson, 1985). Throughout 
the 1990s, various studies were published showing that the access to complementary assets is 
even more important than the assets themselves. The role of capabilities in accessing these 
assets is especially important. The notion of “dynamic capabilities of firms” developed by 
authors such as Loasby (1991, 1999), Kogut and Zander (1992), Teece and Pisano (1994), 
Langlois and Robertson (1995), and Teece (1996) furthered the debate by highlighting that 
the rationale for competitive advantage was based on the capacity of firms to access the 
complementary assets required for the development of their innovations. This capacity is 
essentially based on how firms develop their capabilities in a changing environment, i.e. how 
they adapt, integrate, and reconfigure internal and external organizational skills, resources, 
and functional competences over time, i.e. along the entire innovation process5.  
 
This literature was greatly inspired by the early writings of authors such as Marshall and 
Schumpeter, and more recently of Penrose and Richardson. Penrose (1959) has become an 
essential reference work on the role of capabilities. Penrose depicted, with the greatest clarity, 
that production has to be undertaken by human organizations embodying specifically 
appropriate experience and skills. She gives excellent accounts of how companies grow in 
directions set by their capabilities and how these capabilities expand and alter. She also 
showed that competitive advantage required both the exploitation of existing internal and 
external firm-specific capabilities and newly developed ones6. She had the intuition that 
capabilities interact with activities carried out by firms, an intuition that has been at the core 
of later work7. Richardson’s (1972, 1990, 1998) contributions on the link between capabilities 
                                                 
5 See also for related contributions on the topic in the domain of evolutionary theory, Antonelli (2003), Dosi and 
Malerba (2002), Saviotti (2003), Pavitt (2001), Metcalfe (1995), Witt (2003), and of course Nelson and Winter 
(1982).  
6 This idea was further extended and clarified by Teece (1982) and Wernerfelt (1984). 
7 Indeed, many recent contributions have focused on the question of the relationship between the different 
notions of capabilities (in a Penrosian sense) and competences (in the sense of Prahalad’s and others’ 
contributions). Afuah and Utterback (1997, p. 183), for instance, stress that “competences + firm-specific assets 
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and activities has certainly been too often overlooked. Recent contributions on dynamic 
capabilities have reaffirmed the centrality of this link. But, Richardson in his 1972 article was 
already arguing that it is convenient to think of an industry as carrying out an indefinitely 
large number of activities, activities related to the discovery and estimation of future needs, to 
research, development and design, to the execution and coordination of processes of physical 
transformation, the marketing of goods, and so on. He stressed that these activities must be 
carried out by organizations (i.e. the firm, the market or the cooperation) with appropriate 
capabilities, or, in other words, with appropriate knowledge, experience and skills. He 
proposed the following distinction between similar and complementary activities: activities 
whose undertaking requires the same capability are similar activities, and activities that 
represent different phases in a process of production (and, consequently, do not necessarily 
require the same capabilities) are complementary activities8.  
 
The arguments developed by in these early works or by the dynamic capabilities literature on 
the link between activity, assets and capability, have become the key to transforming a purely 
descriptive layered decomposition of the industry into a road map9.  
 
On the basis of this road map, we can analyse why the different companies locate in the 
different layers, based on their initial capabilities, and how they are able to evolve from one 
layer to the other with the development or acquisition of new capabilities. We can study why 
and how equipment suppliers (Layer 1) have accumulated capabilities related to the 
conception and development of switches, transmission equipment, routers, servers and billing 
software through investing heavily in R&D assets. Network operators (Layer 2), on the other 
hand, have focused their capabilities on the provision of network facilities, and thus 
concentrated on the assets of production (of the infrastructure). Finally, firms in Layers 3, 4, 
and 5 have centred their capabilities on the commercialization and distribution of broadband 
services, ranging from basic to advanced. Each of the companies located in the various layers, 
embodies a specific type of asset and related capabilities that need to be combined in an 
appropriate way, in order for the technological innovation of broadband to be transformed 
into a commercial opportunity. We can also assess from the road map, in terms of layers, 
                                                                                                                                                        
= capabilities or resources (in the Penrosian sense)”. Foss (1997) also provided a fine classification on the 
different notions of competencies/capabilities, as well as on the different notions of activity (including Porter). 
8 These definitions strongly support and shape the framework in terms of the layers described in Section 2.3. 
These definitions also complement point made in Section 2.4. that complementary activities are compatible with 
complementary assets in Teece’s meaning. 
9 See also on the advantages and drawbacks of using a layer representation of the industry (Fransman 2002). 
 14
whether the specialization strategies in one layer, or alternatively the evolution towards other 
layers via integration or cooperation, have been profitable, and why, on the basis of the ability 
or inability of firms to mobilize the relevant capabilities. Previous work has shown that Layer 
1 has tended to be vertically specialized since the early stages of telecommunications 
liberalization (Fransman, 2001, 2004; Krafft, 2003, 2004, and see Table 3).  
 
 
Layers Activities Firms 
Equipment suppliers 
Incumbents Entrants 
Layer 1 Equipment provision 
Lucent, Alcatel, 
NEC, Nortel,  
Cisco, Ascend, 
BayNetworks 
Network operators 
Incumbents Entrants 
Layer 2 Network operation 
ATT, France 
Telecom, 
Deutsche 
Telekom, BT, 
NTT 
Worldcom, Free, 
Tele2, 
Mannesman, 
Mobilcom,Vodaf
one 
Layer 3 Internet access and  service 
provision 
IAPS and ISPs: Wanadoo, 
Freeserve, T-online 
Layer 4 Navigation and security provision Browsers, data protection 
companies: Netscape, Yahoo!, 
Google 
Layer 5 Content provision E-commerce, broadcasting and 
information companies: AOL-Time 
Warner, Vivendi Universal 
 
Table 3: Vertical specialization/integration in the info-coms industry at the age of broadband 
 
But how is broadband affecting this vertical specialization? How are the traditional 
companies, namely the old equipment providers, incumbents in the telecoms industry, 
interacting with the new ones from the software industry? Is a merger between the old and the 
new the solution in terms of development of adequate capabilities? Again, existing evidence 
shows that Layers 2 and 3 first embarked on a strategy of vertical specialization, later turned 
to vertical integration and recently seem to be reverting to vertical specialization. But is this 
vertical integration robust to the generalization of broadband services? Does this structure 
allow the adequate development of capabilities? These questions are at the centre of the two 
stylized facts we examine next.  
 
 
 
SPECIALIzATION 
 
 
 
 
 
INTEGRATION 
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3. SF1: “R&D and patent licensing are increasingly high in this industry, 
but the initiators of innovations have changed greatly over time”  
 
Here, we discuss how R&D and production assets, i.e. conception of equipment (activity in 
Layer 1) and provision of network facilities (activity in Layer 2), are combined to generate 
profitable (or less profitable) outcomes. For a long time, these assets were integrated within a 
single category of firms, the network operators, which had accumulated R&D capabilities in 
basic electrical instruments (cables, semiconductors, aerials), and also some manufacturing 
capabilities related to the production of electronic communication techniques (transmission, 
multipoint communication, digital information). In the mid 1990s, R&D assets and related 
capabilities were progressively disintegrated by network operators to upstream suppliers, the 
equipment providers, the network operators retaining only the production assets. In what 
follows, we document these changes focusing on the key stylized fact that R&D and patent 
licensing have always been important in this industry, but in the broadband era are even more 
important, and that firms investing in R&D assets have changed radically over time. We 
discuss how this stylized fact fits with Teece’s framework, and analyse a) the positive impact 
SF1 had on the entry of new firms, and b) the subsequent negative impact it had on the initial 
developers of the new technology.  
 
3.1. Changes in the source and nature of innovation 
 
Quantitative and qualitative change 
Since the mid 1990s, firms in Layer 1 (equipment suppliers) faced a dual challenge10, which 
greatly affected their innovative strategy: 
− A quantitative net increase in their R&D spending was necessary, since their clients – 
firms in Layer 2 (network operators) – which formerly were the major technology 
providers had decided to exit this activity in a context of fierce price competition and 
full liberalization.  
− A qualitative improvement of the technologies to be provided was needed for an 
extended set of applications, since “closed” traditional telephony (fixed telephony on 
copper wires based on switch and transmission systems) was being superseded by new 
                                                 
10 The reference to a ‘dual challenge’ is a simplification. For a more detailed description of what occurred in the 
telecommunications equipment industry, see Fransman (2002), Calderini and Garrone (2002), Hicks (2001); 
Krafft and Ravix (2005). 
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“open” modes of communications (broadband Internet connection and related 
services, provided through different media such as DSL technologies, radio access, 
satellite connections, optical fibres).  
 
A massive “shifting in the knowledge base [know-how in Teece’s terms], from network 
operators to equipment suppliers” (Fransman, 2001, p. 109) occurred at this time, in relation 
to both the sources and nature of innovation. The change in the source of innovation derived 
from the fact that firms in Layer 2 were progressively delegating R&D activity to firms in 
Layer 1 and that Layer 1 firms were proving not only to be efficient subcontractors but also 
active innovators. The change in the nature of innovation was due to the fact that traditional 
equipment suppliers (such as Lucent, Nortel, Alcatel) were having to compete with new firms 
in Layer 1 (such as Cisco, BayNetworks, Ascend), which had their origins in the software and 
data processing industries and whose R&D capabilities could easily and quickly be extended 
to the conception and development of Internet and broadband technologies.  
 
In terms of R&D, Fransman (2001, 2004) reports that, within a few years, the initial split in 
R&D expenses (on average, 15% of annual sales for network operators, 5% for equipment 
suppliers) was completely reversed (thus 5% of annual sales for network operators, and 15% 
for equipment suppliers). Moreover, he shows there was a disparity in R&D expenses in 
Layer 1: new firms were generally investing more than 15% of their annual sales, while 
traditional equipment suppliers were investing around 10%. 
 
In terms of patent licensing, Figure 1 shows that firms in Layer 1 patented much more than 
firms in Layer 2 whose patent rates stagnated up to the 1980s. Figure 1 also illustrates the 
decoupling that occurred among firms in Layer 1, new firms becoming the leaders of 
innovation, while older, incumbent or traditional firms lagged behind.  
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Figure 1: Evolution of the number of patents by firm on average  
(Technology Class H04 L: transmission digital information, source: EPO) 
 
3.2. Connection with Teece (1986)  
Teece’s (1986) theory was that a profit seeking innovator, confronted by the need to access 
specialized complementary assets and/or capabilities, would be forced to expand its activities 
through integration or collaboration if it were to prevail over imitators. The Annex to this 
paper reminds us that situations differ depending on (i) the degree of intellectual property 
protection, and (ii) the market power of innovators/imitators versus owners of complementary 
assets.  
 
SF1 concerns the first situation described by Teece whereby11: 
• There is a strong legal appropriability regime: each and every innovation can be 
adequately covered by a patent, and firms increasingly rely on legal appropriability 
regimes to protect their innovation. The significant rise in patenting activity (see 
Figure 1 above) since the late 1990s coincides with the spread of broadband and 
confirms that firms (especially in Layer 1) have a stronger interest in protecting their 
innovations than in the narrowband era.  
• The innovators and imitators (Layer 1 firms) are advantageously positioned vis à vis 
independent owners of complementary assets (Layer 2 firms). Firms in Layer 1 have 
invested heavily in R&D (on average at three times the level of firms in Layer 2) and 
thus appear to be the leading companies in the industry. The capacity of many network 
                                                 
11 This situation is denoted (1) by the author. 
New Firms in Layer 1 
Incumbent Firms in Layer 1 
Firms in Layer 2 
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operators (especially those that perform little or no R&D) to provide end-users with 
advanced services on the basis of high capacity and intelligent networks depends on 
the technological know how of firms in Layer 1, and the variety and performance of 
the products and processes they generate. Thus it can be seen that firms in Layer 1 are 
exerting, in Teece’s sense, an important market power over the owners of 
complementary assets (firms in Layer 2).  
 
Figure 2 below provides a focus on this first situation and predicts that, in a Teecian 
framework, Firms in Layer 1 (the innovators) would win. 
 
 Strong legal/technical 
appropriability 
 
Innovators and imitators 
advantageously positioned 
vis a vis independent 
owners of complementary 
assets 
(1) Contract 
 
 
 
 
Innovator 
will win
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A focus on contract, integration strategies, and outcomes for firms in Layer 1:  
R&D and production specialized assets in the broadband industry 
 
In what follows, we will see that firms in Layer 1 are effectively highly specialized and 
contract with firms in Layer 2 to couple their innovation with complementary network assets. 
However, the real innovators in Layer 1 (new firms) did not necessarily win, since they 
suffered a massive programme of acquisition by their competitors and imitators, the older 
traditional firms, the incumbents. 
 
Innovators and imitators: new firms from software and data processing, 
and older telecommunications equipment suppliers (Layer 1) 
Owners of complementary assets: Network operators (Layer 2) 
Specialized assets involved: R&D and production 
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3.3. The positive impact of SF1: emergence of distinct complementary assets, vertical 
specialization and entry 
 
In the early 1990s, distinct assets progressively emerged among Layer 1 and Layer 2 firms, 
based on complementary capabilities. Liberalization in communications infrastructure and 
services triggered important restructurings in the major R&D labs (Bell labs and Bellcore in 
the US, CNET in France, CSELT in Italy, BT labs in the UK). Most were historically related 
to incumbent firms in Layer 2 (the ex-monopolies), and the emergence of competition 
affected them in two essential ways: companies began to outsource, and the labs had to be 
significantly downsized12. This phase of the restructuring left some room for upstream actors, 
the equipment providers, to operate as the main generators of technology, while downstream 
actors, the network operators, began to specialize in mass manufacture of infrastructure and 
related services.  
 
On the one hand, firms in Layer 1 undertook a significant development and refocusing of their 
capabilities. Incumbent firms in Layer 1 became more dependent on firms in Layer 2, even 
more so than in the pre-liberalization period. Equipment suppliers took the initiative to 
transform their capabilities, which, for a long time, had been related to their development as 
subcontractors in programmes initiated by firms in Layer 2, at that time historical monopolies, 
into new capabilities were more related to fundamental research and innovation activities. 
From the mid 1990s, they massively invested in R&D, recruited experts, researchers and 
engineers in physics (optics) and electronics (cable, satellite), increased their patenting 
activity, and thus became the leaders in the info-communications industry in terms of 
innovation in the broadband era. They successfully diffused these innovations to the 
downstream level (the network operation level, or Layer 2) by offering tailor-made 
applications to new entrants in network operation, applications associated with a large 
spectrum of assistance and maintenance services.  
 
On the other hand, Layer 2 underwent a similar refocus. Since there was a fierce competition 
over prices and capacities due to the increasing traffic and diversified applications related to 
                                                 
12 In the US, the Bell labs account for 5,000 employees in 2006 only 1,000 of which are engaged in research 
projects. Many senior researchers left to join Princeton, Columbia and Carnegie Mellon. The research budget 
was reduced to $1.2 billion about a third of the level 15 years earlier. In parallel, research was refocused: most of 
the long term projects in physics (optical elements, digital data processing) were discontinued or outsourced to 
public and private research groups (universities, R&D divisions of equipment suppliers), and replaced by shorter, 
end-user oriented projects (transmission techniques). 
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the Internet, firms in Layer 2 were making high investments in network infrastructure, end-to-
end connections, and broadband services. Incumbent firms in Layer 2, which previously had 
controlled most of the research activities, radically reorganized their R&D divisions, 
reallocating budget and employees to other divisions, mostly commercialization and 
marketing. They voluntarily delegated their innovation activities to equipment suppliers, and 
transformed their capabilities in this domain13. In France, for example, 200 employees left 
France Telecom’s R&D organization (formerly CNET). Researchers and engineers were 
encouraged to create their own start ups, and spinoffs. People working in the administration 
area were generally allocated to more commercial and marketing jobs within France Telecom. 
This occurred in a context in which new network operators were entering Layer 2 without 
having their own R&D activities or related capabilities, but nevertheless generating large 
revenues from the persistent growth in demand, and eventually outperforming the 
incumbents.  
 
From the early stages of liberalization to the spread of broadband, specialization dominated in 
Layers 1 and 2, based on the emergence of two distinct complementary assets (R&D and 
production). The penetration of firms from Layer 1 to other layers was a rare and temporary 
phenomenon; similarly, the penetration of firms from other layers to Layer 1 was shortlived. 
This vertically specialized structure was robust to radical changes, and generated positive 
effects. Within this vertical specialization, incumbent firms in Layer 1 could refocus their 
activities on the challenges brought by the Internet (Lucent, Alcatel, Nortel), and new firms in 
Layer 1 were able to emerge and perform extremely well up to the early 2000s (Cisco, 
BayNetworks, Ascend). This vertical specialization also fostered competition in Layer 2. New 
network operators could enter the industry and remain viable in the face of large, incumbent 
companies, since they could rely on firms in Layer 1 to access the complementary assets 
(R&D, patents, innovations, technologies) and related capabilities that they were unable to 
develop by themselves. 
 
                                                 
13 This is often described in the literature as “knowledge flows”, “knowledge moves”, or “development and 
alteration of capabilities”. See Birkinshaw (2005) in a general context, or Carpenter, O’Sullivan and Lazonick 
(2003) for the specific field of telecommunications.  
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3.4. The negative impact of SF1: a massive process of M&As affected the early 
innovators  
 
New quantitative and qualitative challenges to firms in Layer 1 involved large innovation 
R&D investments, and a re-orientation of the initial know-how towards the development of 
new capabilities. Various business strategies were introduced by incumbents and new entrants 
in Layer 1 to match these innovation and development efforts.  
 
First, a variety of forms of cooperation emerged over the period 1995-1998. Bilateral 
collaborations occurred between the major incumbents and entrants. Alcatel increased its 
bilateral collaborations with Ascend, BayNetworks, Cisco, and Nokia on broadband 
technologies and mobile access. Lucent and Northern Telecom, on the other hand, preferred 
more exclusive bilateral collaboration, respectively with Ascend and BayNetworks. These 
collaborations were intended to favour the creation and diffusion of new technologies 
between incumbents and entrants, to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and develop new 
articulated competencies, and to render quantitative and qualitative coordination in R&D 
assets and related capabilities possible.  
 
Second, there was a massive wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the period 1998-
2000, and especially between incumbents and entrants in Layer 1. M&As were a way of 
acquiring new knowledge and capabilities more rapidly than through inter-firm cooperation. 
Investors, shareholders and business analysts were all in agreement that, in the specific time 
span, the value created by M&As would be higher than the value created by cooperation 
(Krafft and Ravix, 2005). The biggest M&As included Northern Telecom’s acquisition of 
BayNetworks in August 1998 for $6,900 million and Lucent’s acquisition of Ascend in July 
1999 for $20,000 million. During the period December 1998 to December 1999, Alcatel 
acquired Packet Engines ($315 million), Xylan ($2,000 million) and Newbridge ($7,100 
million) in order to strengthen their optical fibre and mobile access activities. However, in the 
year following these M&As Nortel, Lucent, and Alcatel suffered major losses in revenue and 
decreasing share prices.14. 
 
                                                 
14 Business Week (2001, 2002). 
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Thus, the early innovators were taken over by incumbents, and their sources of novelty, such 
as specific R&D capabilities in software and data processing, which had made a large 
contribution to the development of broadband, became diluted with large, and certainly less 
efficient structures. The final step in the process is greater concentration among traditional 
equipment supplier: Alcatel and Lucent are currently engaged in a merger that is intended to 
rationalize their activities, especially R&D.  
 
 
4. SF2: “Small, facilities-less companies emerged throughout the 
development stage of the Internet industry, but have generally performed 
badly when the industry matured and broadband became widespread”  
 
In addressing this stylised fact we focus on the articulation between production and 
commercialization/distribution assets, i.e. provision of network facilities (activity in Layer 2) 
and provision of connectivity (activity in Layer 3), navigation and security (activity in Layer 
4) and content (activity in Layer 5). In the era of narrowband, commercialization/distribution 
of basic services assets were in the hands of two distinct categories of firms, namely facilities-
based companies (the network operators in Layer 2), and facilities-less companies (the 
IAPs/ISPs in Layer 3). But, with the spread of broadband, many of these companies that had 
invested exclusively in assets related to the commercialization/distribution of basic Internet 
services began to show poor performance. Some of the largest facilities-less companies, 
however, such as AOL, Google and Yahoo!, became key leaders in the industry by divesting 
from initial core activities (commercialization/distribution of basic services and, in some 
cases, network assets), and reinvesting in assets related to the commercialization/distribution 
of improved and advanced services. Following the procedure in Section 3, we document what 
occurred in the industry and discuss how it fits into Teece’s framework. We analyse how, 
despite the key role that IAPs and ISPs played in the development of broadband, a) SF2 
massively affected the population of firms in Layer 3 and caused most to exit the market since 
they did not have access to the complementary assets related to the 
commercialisation/distribution of improved and advanced services, while b) favouring the 
emergence of some (but very few) vertically integrated champions.  
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4.1. The growth and decline of ISPs/IAPS 
 
From narrowband to broadband 
Firms in Layer 3 (IAPs and ISPs) have played a major role in the development of the Internet 
industry15. Layer 3 appeared in the early 1990s when the development of the world-wide-web 
(WWW) allowed a multiplicity of new services such as data transmission, e-commerce and 
the development of web sites. At that time, vertical specialization was predominant: 
ISPs/IAPs, as autonomous firms independent of those in Layer 2 (network operators), 
contributed directly to the development and diffusion of the Internet. In fact, the technical 
separation (the TCP/IP interface) between the network and services implied that these 
ISPs/IAPs could simply lease infrastructure from the network operators, or develop points of 
presence on it to connect their customers end to end (see Kavassalis, Salomon and Benghozi, 
1996). Moreover, although some firms in Layer 2, such as MCI and Sprint in the US, had 
entered the Internet business as Internet backbone providers, most were latecomers to the 
sector. This provided the opportunity for many small new firms to prosper and become 
prominent in the Internet’s early stage development.  
 
However, this role reduced over time, and especially from the mid-1990s. Several firms in 
Layer 2 were able to penetrate the connectivity market by means of vertical integration, i.e. 
either by developing Internet activities internally, or by acquiring existing ISPs/IAPs. In fact, 
Internet access and many Internet services (such as e-mail and web hosting) were becoming a 
commodity business driven by economies of scale and scope, essentially captured by network 
operators from Layer 2. Moreover, the advent of free Internet access was robbing ISPs/IAPs 
of much of their revenues and making it increasingly difficult for them to differentiate 
themselves. While content may have been a key differentiator (as the big ISPs/IAPs such as 
AOL, Yahoo! and Google recognized), the cost of differentiated high-demand content was 
prohibitive for many smaller ISPs/IAPs. Finally, the development of broadband Internet 
certainly favoured facilities-based companies, such as network operators, over the facilities-
less IAPs/ISPs16.  
                                                 
15  While many studies have described the nature of broadband availability and the effects of policy on 
availability, little has been written from the perspective of the IAPs/ISPs. A few exceptions are Fransman 
(2006); Van Gorp, Maitland, and Hanekop (2006); and Greenstein (2001). 
16 Vertical integration then was the emerging structure until the late 1990s. However, recent decisions by 
network operators to reorganize their Internet activities into an independent structure, eventually to be listed on 
the stock markets, has tended to favour the rebirth of vertical specialization since 2003. In the US, for instance, 
AT&T decided to restructure and establish various independent companies to concentrate on Internet activity. In 
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4.2. Connection with Teece (1986) 
 
Based on the Annex to this paper, which synthesizes Teece’s conclusions, SF2 relates to 
situations (5) and (6):  
• There is weak legal/technical appropriability: competitive advantage lies not so much 
in the technology provided by IAPs/ISPs, but rather in the spectrum of applications 
and services that can be offered to end-users. The Internet industry can be said to have 
reached a stage of relative maturity, with narrowband representing the emergence and 
growth phases, and broadband corresponding to the late phases of development. 
• The innovators and imitators (Firms in Layer 3) are disadvantageously positioned vis à 
vis independent owners of complementary assets, either because they do not own 
network assets (developed by Firms in Layer 2), or because they have not invested in 
related downstream assets (such as navigation, security and content) required to 
provide a large range of services.  
 
However, firms that were in existence in the era of narrowband and who on the introduction 
of broadband, were able to evolve their strategies of exclusive specialization in basic services 
to include development of navigation, security, and content activities for more advanced 
services, are the winners and the real innovators. Alternatively, firms that remained 
exclusively specialized are the losers. 
 
This leads to two distinct scenarios as described by Teece. The first (corresponding to 
situation (6) in Figure 3 below) encompasses most of the smallest ISPs/IAPS, that were 
poorly positioned in terms of commissioning complementary assets, that were driven to 
bankruptcies and major failures, or were eventually acquired by network assets holders (Firms 
in Layer 2)17. The second scenario encompasses the large ISPs/IAPs such as AOL, Yahoo! 
and Google, which are excellently positioned with respect to commissioning complementary 
assets. In this case, effective vertical integration and access to other’s complementary 
                                                                                                                                                        
Europe, BT was split into BT Retail, BT Ignite, BT Wireless, Yell, BT OpenWorld, and Netco (a new company). 
France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom also underwent some radical restructuring, with the introduction on the 
stock markets of their Internet divisions, structured within specific companies (see France Telecom with 
Wanadoo-Freeserve, and Deutsche Telekom with T-online). While the reasons for these restructurings are quite 
diverse, but more or less pressured by investors and financial markets, the outcome is an observed vertical 
specialization between Layers 2 and 3.  
17 These innovators are the losers in Teece’s terms, since many were acquired when their market capitalization 
was already declining, and those that were not went bankrupt.  
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activities was the road to success. However, this required the development and integration of 
new capabilities, and adaptations to existing ones, i.e. it involved a highly uncertain process, 
especially in the context of the exploding financial bubble18. 
 
Weak legal/technical appropriability  
Innovator excellently 
positioned versus 
imitators with respect to 
commissioning 
complementary assets 
Innovator poorly 
positioned versus 
imitators with respect to 
commissioning 
complementary assets 
Innovators and imitators 
disadvantageously 
positioned vis a vis 
independent owners of 
complementary assets 
(5) Integrate 
 
 
 
 
Innovator 
would win
(6) Contract (to limit 
exposure) 
 
 
 
Innovator 
will probably lose 
to imitators 
and/or assets holders
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A focus on contract, integration strategies, and outcomes for firms in Layer 3:  
production and commercialization/distribution specialized assets in the broadband industry 
 
4.3. The negative impact of SF2: massive exits of firms lacking access to complementary 
assets  
 
IAPs/ISPs stimulated innovation and competition in the Internet industry. They introduced 
competition among many new and innovative players, some facilities-less, others facilities-
based companies. They contributed to the diffusion among end-users of a major innovation by 
providing customers with a large spectrum of new services and enabling them to become 
familiar with the new medium of the Internet. Initially, then, firms in Layer 3 clearly 
outperformed firms in Layer 2 in this emerging business activity.  
                                                 
18 These firms were able to maintain a high level of market capitalization (at least higher than most of the 
facilities-less companies), and used it to engage in stock for stock transactions in vertically-related businesses.  
Innovators and imitators: IAPs/ISPs (Layer 3) 
Owners of complementary assets: Network 
operators (Layer 2), Navigation and security 
providers (Layer 4), Content providers (Layer 5) 
Specialized assets involved: Production and 
commercialization/distribution of basic, 
improved and advanced services 
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The central strategy in the development of IAPs/ISPs was specific interconnection 
agreements, which, from the earliest days of Internet development, were based on a specific 
pricing regime known as ‘peering’ (Srinagesh, 1997). The peering system allowed free use of 
the network of another company, under a reciprocity agreement. This system, which was 
implemented in a vertically disintegrated industry structure, was viable in the early stages of 
the development of the Internet. As traffic increased, however, facilities-based companies, the 
network operators in Layer 2, were having to cover the high costs related to the operation and 
management of the Internet networks while the facilities-less companies in Layer 3 
(IAPs/ISPs) were enjoying use of these backbones either for free or in return for a very small 
payment and at the same time were charging their customers for the services they provided in 
the final market. The exceptions were the free Internet IAPs/ISPs, which relied on revenues 
generated by advertising or connected and cross activities. Eventually the incentives for firms 
in Layer 2 to charge for the use of their complementary network assets became too great for 
this situation to continue.  
 
Firms in Layer 3 were increasingly unable to generate revenues. They became less attractive 
to investors and were unable to continue to access finance from banks and stock markets. The 
outcome was a massive shakeout among this population of firms, which either exited, or were 
acquired by firms in Layer 2. In Europe, 50% of these firms disappeared at the time of the 
financial crash, while in the US this was 70%19. In France, the incumbent network operator, 
France Telecom, merged its internal division, Wanadoo, with the ISP Freeserve, which had 
contributed to the emergence of the free Internet economy in the UK and Europe. 
 
4.4. The positive impact of SF2: the survival of vertically integrated champions 
 
Though the development of free Internet services was for some firms the key to success, 
many of them had tried to differentiate themselves by offering a wide spectrum of associated 
services, beyond basic and standardized end-to-end connectivity. This process of 
differentiation, however, was long and uncertain since it required the integration of new assets 
and related capabilities, and the disintegration of older ones. 
 
                                                 
19 In this domain, the venture capital industry (Avnimelech and Teubal, 2004) has registered bad performance 
since many of these companies were mostly supported by business angels which assumed incredibly high levels 
of risk.  
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From the mid 1990s to the late 1990s, firms specialized in activities such as navigation, 
software/middleware, information and broadcasting activities, each of which contributed, in a 
rather independent way, to the development of the info-communications industry. In fact, all 
these firms were engaged in the development of the Internet and its associated applications, 
but their core activities related to industries that were previously separated: computer industry 
(hardware and software), press, information, and broadcasting (TV and radio programmes). 
The development of data transfer provided one of the first opportunities for these different 
firms to develop closer links with each other, as soon as the requirements of the large 
customers (essentially big companies) in terms of security and reliability, had emerged.  
 
In the next stage (from the early 2000s), with the development of e-commerce and m-
commerce, and the emergence of new services (secure and multi-content applications) 
associated with high speed Internet, the info-communications industry has been comprised of 
firms that are more closely connected. Even when the characteristics of final demand were 
still highly uncertain, firms were tending to coordinate the different (vertically-related) value-
added services they were providing to customers, essentially by resorting to vertical 
integration. In this stage, the largest IAPs/ISPs which previously had been involved in Layer 
3, began to consolidate their activities in Layers 4 and 5. These acquisitions were specific 
attempts to achieve viability in a (highly uncertain) innovation through the step by step 
articulation of vertically related activities, and systematic investment in 
commercialization/distribution assets for improved and advanced services. Broadband 
Internet and associated (safe and multi-content) applications appeared as a systemic 
innovation whose implementation required close coordination among the firms in different 
layers. As such, in accordance with Teece (1986), vertical integration seemed to provide this 
coordination, and favoured the conversion of end-to-end connectivity activity into more 
value-added activities such as navigation and content activities. Three companies adopted this 
strategy: AOL, Google and Yahoo!.  
 
AOL-Time Warner: AOL was established before the Internet era as a network supplier of 
value-added information services, but quickly adapted to the rapidly diffusing Internet. 
Though some predicted that AOL would be undermined by the Internet, this did not happen. 
Indeed, by the turn of the century and with the spread of broadband, an astounding 40% of the 
total amount of time Americans spent on the Internet was within AOL’s ‘walled garden’, 
essentially due to the huge capability of the company to commercialize and distribute its value 
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added information services throughout the web. Initially, AOL decided to develop its own 
network, and invested in production assets. However, this investment was essentially 
motivated by financial considerations: AOL’s market capitalization was very high and this 
favoured any (even ‘wrong’ or at least inappropriate) types of integration. In addition, 
network operation was not one of the core capabilities of the company. The seeming 
incompatibility between internal capabilities (commercialization/distribution) and newly 
integrated ones (network operation), and the complex task involved in recruiting people with 
the skills to make the link between these two fields of activity, soon decided AOL to leave the 
transport of its traffic to specialists and it sold both its network (and that of Compuserve 
which it had acquired) to firms in Layer 2 (especially to WorldCom prior to this company’s 
bankruptcy). In January 2000, AOL underwent a further transformation. Having abandoned 
its networks, it acquired Netscape, the browser, followed by Time Warner, the broadcasting 
company, with two purposes in mind. The first was to acquire the content that would 
distinguish itself from other IAPs and ISPs (and allow it to continue charging its customers a 
monthly fee). The second was to guarantee access to both residential and business customers 
by acquiring Time Warner’s cable network, the second largest after AT&T’s. This second 
transformation of AOL was smoother than the first. Though financial considerations entered 
into it, and eventually led AOL to focus predominantly on market capitalization, the company 
at this time was clearly concentrating on the development of new capabilities and articulation 
with existing ones. Commercialization and distribution capabilities were maintained and 
extended through recruitment of experts on the connection between the media and broadband. 
Technicians, but also economists, business strategists and lawyers, especially in the field of 
intellectual property rights, now figure prominently among the company’s employees. 
 
Yahoo!: Yahoo! was founded in 1994 by Stanford PhD students David Filo and Jerry Yang. 
Like AOL, Yahoo! does not own its own complementary network assets although, of course, 
it is crucially dependent on them. Yahoo!’s strategy is not to invest in production assets at a 
significant level, but rather to develop successful partnerships with the world’s leading 
broadband network providers. For instance, Yahoo! provides tightly integrated and co-
branded arrangements with SBC, Verizon, Bellsouth, Rogers Canada and British Telecom, 
offering a range of free and premium content and services to subscribers. Yahoo! has also 
invested heavily in complementary assets related to commercialization/distribution of 
advanced services, such as search activities. Yahoo! is one of the leading search engines on 
the web. Based on a combination of an advanced set of algorithms to ensure that results are up 
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to date, relevant and comprehensive, Yahoo! enables users to find anything and everything 
they need on the Internet instantaneously. These inner capabilities were extended to the 
commercialization/distribution of search engine services, while in the entertainment and high-
quality media content sectors, Yahoo! has partnerships with hundreds of premier content 
providers.  
 
Google: Funded by Larry Page and Sergei Brin, Google is now widely recognized as the 
world’s largest search engine, an easy-to-use free service that usually produces relevant 
results in a fraction of a second. Google is based on a couple of technological innovations: 
PageRank technology, which performs objective measurement of the importance of web 
pages by counting the links to this page from all over the WWW, and Hypertext-Matching 
analysis, which captures the full content of a page and subdivisions, and the precise location 
of each word, as well as the content of neighbouring pages. Google generates revenue by 
providing advertisers with the opportunity to deliver measurable, cost-effective online 
advertising that is relevant to the information displayed on the page. This makes the 
advertising useful to the Internet user, and also to the advertiser placing it. Google does not 
own the complementary network assets, but relies on the network provided by AT&T, Sprint, 
Nextel, Palm, and Vodafone. However, Google has invested in developing marketing and 
distribution assets and services. For instance, Google AdWords is a program that promotes 
advertisers’ products and services on the web through targeted advertising; Google AdSense 
delivers ads relevant to the content of the sites, improving their ability to generate revenue, 
and enhancing the experience for their users.  
 
The background and trajectories of these companies are obviously different in each case. 
AOL initially invested in commercialization/distribution of value added information services 
prior to the Internet, then turned to investment in production and 
commercialization/distribution assets with the introduction of the Internet, and then further 
divested production assets, and expanded into commercialization/distribution from basic to 
improved and advanced services. In this latter process, it was necessary to integrate the two 
major companies Netscape and Time Warner, which had for years specialized in these areas. 
Yahoo! and Google took a different route. They first invested in 
commercialization/distribution of basic services in the age of narrowband. They did not invest 
to any significant extent in network production assets but preferred to extend their existing 
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assets to commercialization of improved services. They relied on partnerships for the 
development of the advanced services they commercialize and distribute.  
 
Though their strategies were different, each of these business stories demonstrates that, in a 
weak legal/technical appropriability regime, when firms are disadvantageously positioned vis 
a vis independent owners of complementary assets, the key to success is to achieve a better 
positioning than that of imitators with respect to commissioning complementary assets. This 
is often accomplished by the integration of new assets initially owned by other companies, 
and by the development of close partnerships that allow significant transformation of internal 
capabilities into new ones. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
One of the aims of this paper was to assess the robustness of Teece (1986) to provide a 
framework that was relevant to the changes that have occurred in the info-coms industry with 
the coming of broadband. To achieve this, we defined info-communications in terms of five 
complementary activities and their corresponding assets. We analysed how firms located in 
one activity and owning a specific type of asset were able to evolve from this activity to 
another (and thus invest in new assets), and especially whether this evolution was profitable 
or not. Focusing on two essential stylized facts that are particularly pertinent to the industry, 
we found that 20 years since it was published, Teece (1986) still provides a robust framework, 
and one that can be used to analyse who profits, and how, in the info-coms industry.  
 
In relation to the first of these stylized facts (SF1: “R&D and patent licensing are increasing 
in this industry, but the initiators of innovations have changed radically over time”) we show 
that Teece (1986) was absolutely right in maintaining that in a strong legal appropriability 
regime, and with innovators and imitators advantageously positioned vis à vis independent 
owners of complementary assets, innovators should win. We would argue that the only thing 
that Teece overlooked is that, given important changes in the source and nature of innovation, 
innovators (in our paper, the new equipment suppliers from the data processing and software 
industry) will eventually be acquired by imitators (the incumbent, traditional equipment 
suppliers).  
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In terms of the second stylized fact (SF2: “Small, facilities-less companies were emerging 
everywhere during  the development of the Internet industry, but generally have performed 
badly as industry has matured and broadband has become widespread”), we show that Teece 
was right in his prediction that in a weak legal/technical appropriability regime (which in our 
paper corresponds to the maturity of the Internet industry in the broadband era), and given 
that the innovators and imitators are disadvantageously positioned vis à vis independent 
owners of complementary assets, the only success strategy is vertical integration. Here, we 
argue that what Teece might have emphasized more is that vertical integration would be the 
solution, provided that companies could effectively acquire and integrate the required 
capabilities. This was not possible for most of the smallest ISPs/IAPs, which nevertheless 
were active in and contributed to the development of the Internet industry. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that there are many lessons that can still be drawn from Teece’s 
(1986) framework and related contributions. We hope that the findings from our study might 
stimulate further work on two essential topics, which are closer to pure industrial dynamics 
issues: 1) deeper analysis of the sources of technology provision, and 2) investigation of the 
role of firm heterogeneity. These reflections could become the basis for a research agenda 
based on relating the dynamics of complementary assets and capabilities to the dynamics of 
innovative industries within a coherent, unique framework.  
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Annex: Revisiting Teece (1986): Contract, integration strategies, and outcomes for innovators 
in the info-coms industry at the age of broadband 
 
 
Weak legal/technical appropriability  Strong legal/technical 
appropriability 
Innovator excellently 
positioned versus 
imitators with respect to 
commissioning 
complementary assets 
Innovator poorly 
positioned versus 
imitators with respect to 
commissioning 
complementary assets 
Innovators and imitators 
advantageously 
positioned vis a vis 
independent owners of 
complementary assets 
(1) Contract 
 
 
 
 
Innovator 
will win
(2) Contract 
 
 
 
 
 
Innovator 
should win 
(3) Contract 
 
 
 
 
Innovator 
or imitator 
will win; 
assets owners won’t 
benefit 
Innovators and imitators 
disadvantageously 
positioned vis a vis 
independent owners of 
complementary assets 
(4) Contract if can do so 
on competitive terms; 
integrate if necessary 
 
 
Innovator 
should win; 
may have to 
share profits 
with asset holders
(5) Integrate 
 
 
 
 
Innovator 
would win
(6) Contract (to limit 
exposure) 
 
 
 
Innovator 
will probably lose 
to imitators 
and/or assets holders
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SF1: “R&D and patent licensing are 
increasingly high in this industry, but the 
initiators of innovation have greatly 
changed over time” 
SF2: “Small, facilities-less companies have 
generally popped up everywhere at the stage of 
development of the Internet industry, but have 
also generally performed badly when this 
industry matured with the generalization of 
broadband” 
Degree of intellectual property protection 
M
arket pow
er of innovators/im
itators versus ow
ners of com
plem
entary assets 
